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Jouko Rautava *
The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate
in Russia‘s economy
Abstract
Most people seem to think that Russia’s economy and fiscal situation are still crucially tied
up with international oil prices and the exchange rate of the rouble, although this view has
recently been challenged by some analysts. Empirical research on this topic is, however,
scanty. In this paper, the impact of international oil prices and the real exchange rate on
Russia's economy and fiscal policy is analysed using VAR methodology and cointegration
techniques. The research period covered is 1995:Q1 – 2001:Q3. The results indicate that in
the long run a 10% permanent increase (decrease) in international oil prices is associated
with a 2.2% growth (fall) in the level of Russian GDP. Respectively, a 10% real apprecia-
tion (depreciation) of the rouble is associated with a 2.4% decline (increase) in the level of
output. These long-run equilibrium relationships also have a significant impact on short-
run dynamics through an error-correction mechanism. The estimation results confirm also
a strong dependence of fiscal revenues on output and oil price fluctuations. Estimated pa-
rameters and diagnostic statistics do not indicate that Russia’s dependence on oil and the
real exchange rate would somehow have weakened in recent years.
Key words: Russian economy, fiscal policy, oil, real exchange rate, VAR, cointegration
* Jouko Rautava, economist, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, P.O. Box 160,
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Jouko Rautava
The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate
in Russia’s economy
Tiivistelmä
Useimmat ihmiset näyttävät edelleen ajattelevan, että öljyn hintakehitys ja reaalinen va-
luuttakurssi vaikuttavat voimakkaasti Venäjän talouskehitykseen ja valtiontalouden tuloi-
hin, joskin viime aikoina tämä näkemys on eräiden tarkkailijoiden toimesta kyseenalais-
tettu. Aiheen tärkeydestä huolimatta sitä on tutkittu empiirisesti vain hyvin vähän. Tässä
tutkimuksessa öljyn hinnan ja reaalisen valuuttakurssin vaikutusta Venäjän talouteen ja
finanssipolitiikkaan on analysoitu VAR-mallilla yhteisintegroituvuus-kehikossa. Tutki-
musjakso on 1995:Q1 – 2001:Q3. Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että pysyvä 10 prosentin öljyn
hintojen nousu (lasku) kasvattaa (vähentää) pitkällä aikavälillä Venäjän kokonaistuotannon
(BKT) tasoa 2.2 prosentilla. Vastaavasti pysyvä ruplan reaalinen vahvistuminen (heiken-
tyminen) 10 prosentilla johtaa pitkällä aikavälillä 2.4 prosentin kokonaistuotannon laskuun
(kasvuun). Näillä pitkän aikavälin tasapainorelaatioilla on merkittävä vaikutus lyhyen ai-
kavälin dynamiikkaan virheenkorjausmekanismin kautta. Estimointitulokset vahvistavat
myös, että keskushallinnon tulot riippuvat voimakkaasti kokonaistuotannon ja öljyn hinto-
jen vaihteluista. Tämän tutkimuksen mukaan Venäjän talouden riippuvuus energian hin-
nasta ja reaalisen valuuttakurssin tasosta ei ole vähentynyt viime vuosina.
Asiasanat: Venäjä, talouskehitys, öljy, valuuttakurssi, VAR, yhteisintegroituvuusBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2002
7
1  Introduction
Soon after the August 1998 crisis Russia’s economy started to recover quickly, as the wea-
kened rouble improved the price competitiveness of Russian firms and increased their pro-
fitability. Since the second quarter of 1999, in addition to the cheap rouble, Russia's trade
surplus continued to strengthen due to an oil price-led export boom, which contributed to
growth by easing liquidity constraints in the economy. The speed of the turnaround in the
economy was surprisingly fast, given all the weaknesses regarding economic policy-
making and the institutional environment in Russia in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis.
While Russia’s gross domestic product declined in 1998 by 5%, in the following year the
growth rate exceeded 5%, and accelerated further to 8% in 2000. In 2001, the real growth
of Russia's GDP decelerated back to 5%.
Strong export and growth performance helped to solve immediate fiscal problems,
which were the ultimate reason for the 1998 collapse. Moreover, the overall situation im-
proved dramatically after spring 2000, when President Putin’s administration came into
power. Compared to previous governments, the new government was much more serious
regarding stabilisation policies and, in particular, in promoting reforms. Naturally, all these
changes in policy-making were possible only due to better relations among the main politi-
cal decision-making bodies – the president, the government, and the parliament – in post-
Yeltsin Russia.
In spite of major reform initiatives, progress in legislation and changes in the business
atmosphere, the core question remains: How vulnerable is Russia’s economic and fiscal
situation to changes in world market energy prices and the exchange rate of the rouble?
While some people claim that due to political factors and economic reforms Russia’s de-
pendence on oil has declined, one can argue that such conclusions are perhaps premature,
as only a few reforms have really been implemented in practice and in any case the core
structure of the economy changes slowly.
This paper contributes to this discussion by analysing Russia’s oil dependence using
VAR modelling and cointegration techniques. The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. In the next section, recent discussion on the role of international oil prices is pre-
sented and commented on. Section 3 deals with data issues and unit root tests. In the fourth
section, a VAR and cointegration framework is used to analyse long-run relationships
among Russian GDP, fiscal revenues, the real exchange rate of the rouble and international
oil prices. Based on this analysis, a parsimonious short-run error-correction model for the
variables concerned is estimated in Section 5. The robustness of these results is checked in
Section 6 by using an aggregate raw material price index instead of an oil variable. The
paper concludes with discussion on the significance of the results.Jouko Rautava The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy
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2  A common view on the role of oil prices
As mentioned above, there is a common perception that oil prices and the real exchange
rate have a major impact on Russia’s GDP dynamics. This view is based on the fact that
exports in relation to GDP in 2001 totalled about one-third, and roughly half of export
revenues came from energy. Moreover, the federal budget is believed to be heavily de-
pendent on both output developments and energy prices. According to several sources,
revenues from the energy sector account for 30-40 % of central government total reve-
nues.
1
The attached graphs (Figure 1) on the development of output, real federal revenues,
the real effective exchange rate and oil prices reinforce the view that there are strong links
among the relevant variables. In particular, fiscal revenues seem to follow closely oil
prices and GDP trends. The dependence of output on oil prices is perhaps not as obvious as
in the case of fiscal revenues, although the graphs reveal co-movements of GDP and oil
prices before the August 1998 crisis and again since 1999. The real exchange rate graph
indicates that since the beginning of 1995 there has been a tendency for the real exchange
rate to appreciate, except in 1998 when the rouble collapsed as a result of the August crisis.
Incidentally, real exchange rate appreciation is a common feature in most transition
economies (the Balassa-Samuelson effect). Nevertheless, the nature of the relationship
between output and the real exchange rate is not evident from the figures alone. One
should also notice the dramatic impact of the August 1998 crisis on Russian data series.
The 1998 events raise questions about possible structural breaks in the series and, conse-
quently, whether there have been some deep changes in the working and dynamics of the
Russian economy after 1998.

































Oil price (Brent), USD/bbl
                                                
1 For example, OECD (2002) reports that gas and electricity taxes alone covered some 30 % of  all
federal budgetary revenues in 2000.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2002
9
Despite a general view that oil plays an important role in the Russian economy, there is
surprisingly little research on how oil prices affect Russian macroeconomic dynamics.
Most analyses are based on rather simple and straightforward calculations as to how much
a one dollar-change in the price of crude oil will change Russia’s export or fiscal revenues.
Thus, typically assessments by the Russian government, international financial institutions
or investment banks focus on Russia’s external and fiscal vulnerability, i.e., Russia’s abil-
ity to service its debts.
Given that Russia exports some 150 million tons of crude oil per year, it is easy to
compute that a dollar change in the world market price of oil per barrel would result in a
USD 1.1 billion change in Russia’s annual export revenues. Based on oil price information,
one can further try to assess how other energy exports react to oil price changes and, con-
sequently, what the overall impact is on external and fiscal balances. Thus, for example, in
autumn 2001 Russia’s prime minister Kasyanov said – presumably based on calculations
by the government’s think tanks – that a one dollar change in the price of a barrel of oil
will change the total income of the Russian economy by USD 2 billion and federal reve-
nues by 1 billion.
2
In its Country Report 2001 for Russia, the IMF offers a more sophisticated medium-
term assessment of Russia’s external vulnerability to oil price changes. In the report, two
alternative oil price scenarios are presented. Under the baseline scenario, it is expected that
international oil prices fall gradually to USD 19.5 per barrel between end-2001 and 2006,
the real exchange rate of the rouble continues to strengthen, and that economic reforms
proceed. Given these assumptions, Russia’s external balance will weaken significantly, but
the current account will continue to show a healthy surplus. On the other hand, according
to the IMF low oil price scenario, in which oil prices fall to USD 15 per barrel at the end of
2001, the current account surplus will still remain positive, though in the first years almost
2% of GDP lower than under the baseline. Lower energy prices will also decrease foreign
exchange reserves and weaken the fiscal situation so that over 2002-06, enlarged govern-
ment revenues will be on average 1% of GDP lower than under the baseline. Nevertheless,
the difference between the two scenarios does not seem to be particularly dramatic, which
might lead one to think that Russia’s dependence on oil is not particularly strong.
Several investment banks have also given similar assessments concerning the role of
oil in the Russian economy and, in particular, Russia’s vulnerability to a sudden oil price
decline. Most country reports seem to conclude that due to an excellent fiscal and external
situation as well as a pro-reform government, Russia is today much less vulnerable to oil
price declines than before the 1998 crisis.
A salient shortcoming of the aforementioned assessments is that they are based on a
predetermined GDP assumption rather than on a system in which the GDP is determined
endogenously and which explicitly takes into account how output changes due to terms of
trade shock caused by energy price changes. While some analyses present a macroeco-
nomic model for the Russian economy, they do not cover the particular issue of Russia’s
oil price dependence.
3 Likewise, the impact of the real exchange rate on GDP has gained
                                                
2 A similar ”rule-of-thumb” estimate of the effects of a one dollar-change on Russia’s exports and






2001) and several other investment banks.
3 See Basdevant (2000), and Gavrilenkov and Henry (1999).Jouko Rautava The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy
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only little attention in empirical research, although there is a broad consensus regarding the
importance of this topic.
4
Recently, however, discussion concerning Russia’s oil dependence has become more
interesting - and controversial. In several occasions during fall 2001, it was argued that
decreases in oil prices have no negative impact on real GDP growth.
5 Because these views
were based on a macroeconomic model developed for the Russian Ministry for Economic
Development and Trade, they might have an influence on decision-makers. Hence, there is
an additional motivation to examine and elaborate on the issue.
3  Data and unit root tests
In this paper, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model and a cointegration framework are used
to examine the effect of oil price and real exchange rate changes on GDP and fiscal re-
venues. Thus, the idea is to test whether the data currently available allow construction of a
reasonable econometric model for the Russian economy that would give some additional
empirical evidence concerning long-run relations among the relevant variables.
For the time being, a natural reason for the lack of empirical work on the impact of
oil prices and the real exchange rate on Russia’s economy has been data problems. In par-
ticular, time series regarding output and fiscal operations are short, and frequent revisions
of data make their use inconvenient. Moreover, due to the transition process, there have
been various structural and institutional changes in Russia that complicate empirical analy-
sis. Thus, while diagnostic tests should give us a hint of the magnitude of such data prob-
lems, a very short and exceptional research period inevitably means that all results will be
tentative.
In this paper, quarterly data for 1995:Q1 – 2001:Q3 are used to estimate a VAR model
for the Russian economy. The model includes Russian GDP, federal government revenue
and the real exchange rate of the rouble as endogenous variables. International oil prices
comprise an exogenous (non-modelled) variable. The GDP index (level) is computed using
data from Goskomstat, while data for federal government revenues and oil prices
6 are
taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). The real effective exchange
rate data are from the IFS and the Russian Economic Trends (RECEP). The consumer
price index is used as a deflator to compute real revenue figures. As Figure 1 indicates,
there is strong seasonal variation in the GDP and revenue series and, consequently, season-
ally adjusted data are used for these two variables. Moreover, as the lag between the spot
oil price and actual contract prices is some 3-4 months, and between the oil price and gas
prices 6-9 months, a four-quarter moving average is used for the oil price variable.
Consequently, the list of variables, all of which are in logarithmic form, and their ab-
breviations are as follows: Log of seasonally adjusted real GDP (gdp); log of seasonally
adjusted real revenues of the central government (gov); log of the rouble’s real effective
exchange rate (rex); and log of the oil price (oil).
                                                
4 Gavrilenkov and Henry (1999) use their macroeconomic model for Russia to examine the
economic consequences of a nominal exchange rate devaluation of the rouble.
5 For example, Rudiger Ahrend, ”			” The Moscow Times, 16 October 2001.
6 Russian Urals crude oil is expected to follow closely the price of North Sea Brent, a benchmark
price used in this exercise.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2002
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Unit root tests regarding the order of integration of the series give somewhat contra-
dicting results (see Table 1). While most tests indicate that real output, revenues and the
exchange rate are I(1) variables, some of the tests conclude that the oil price is a stationary
variable in this particular sample period. Nevertheless, the results show that all the vari-
ables are integrated of, at most, order one. Thus, given the earlier discussion, graphs, eco-
nomic theory considerations and the properties of individual series, it seems acceptable to
proceed to construct a formal econometric system in order to examine whether there are
stationary long-run relationships among Russian GDP, federal budget revenues, the real
exchange rate and international oil prices; i.e., we now proceed to analyse whether the
variables are cointegrated.
Table 1. Unit root tests for sample period 1995 Q1 – 2001 Q3
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Phillips-Perron test
None Constant Con. + Trend None Constant Con. + Trend
gdp 0.54 -0.70 -0.93 0.36 -0.81 -0.77
Dgdp -2.84** -2.83 -3.75* -3.58** -3.55* -4.29*
gov 0.18 -1.23 -1.09 0.03 -1.71 -1.47
Dgov -3.23** -3.18* -3.31 -5.95** -5.86** -6.17**
rex -0.12 -2.15 -2.20 0.10 -1.79 -1.87
Drex -3.62** -3.54* -3.51 -3.62** -3.54* -3.47
oil 0.05 -4.72** -4.96** 0.61 -1.22 -1.61
Doil -2.77** -2.73 -2.65 -2.08* -2.11 -2.01
Notes: Due to seasonally adjusted data, only one lag is used for calculations. * and ** denote sig-
nificance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
4  Long-run analysis: VAR and cointegration
In the previous section it was found that GDP, fiscal revenues and the real exchange rate
are in levels non-stationary I(1) variables, while the results for the oil price variable were
somewhat mixed. Nevertheless, the results allow for the possibility that there is a station-
ary long-run relationship among the variables concerned. Given the focus of this paper, we
would particularly like to know how the level of GDP on the one hand, and the level of
fiscal revenues on the other hand, react in the long run to changes in the level of oil prices
and the real exchange rate. A VAR model and cointegration techniques are used to get new
insights into these relationships.
Given the small number of observations, there is a need to keep the system as small as
possible in order to allow for the estimation of parameters. Thus, a VAR system including
GDP (gdp), fiscal revenues (gov) and the real exchange rate (rex) is constructed to illus-
trate the functioning of the Russian economy.
7 The oil price variable (oil) is treated as a
non-modelled exogenous variable, because international oil prices are believed to be de-
termined outside the system. Indeed, the basic idea is to enrich possible long-run cointe-
                                                
7 One should notice that the system represents Russia’s economy perhaps more broadly than one
would first expect since, besides output and the fiscal sector, the real exchange rate captures both
nominal exchange rate and inflation effects.Jouko Rautava The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy
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gration relationships among system variables by allowing the oil price variable in the
cointegration space.
Starting with four lags, the system was finally reduced to a second-order VAR. Re-
duction was based on information on the significance of estimated parameters in the sys-
tem and single equations, as well as an F-test related to system reduction. Quite surpris-
ingly, it was found that no dummies were needed, in spite of the dramatic events of the
August 1998 crisis and some other exceptional periods. There were no particular problems
with diagnostics of the system or single equations (see Appendix 1).
8
The cointegration results are reported in Tables 2a and 2b. The maximum-eigenvalue
test and the trace test both allow for two cointegration vectors. Given the test results shown
in Table 2a, it seems plausible to assume two cointegration vectors.
Table 2a. Cointegration results
SYS Cointegration analysis 1995 (1) to 2001 (3)
    eigenvalue     loglik for rank
                     232.886   0
      0.623528       246.074   1
      0.422493       253.486   2
     0.0525691       254.215   3
Maximum eigenvalue test       Trace test
Ho:rank=p  -Tlog(1-\mu)   using T-nm   95%  -T\Sum log(.)  using T-nm   95%
 p ==  0        26.38**      20.52    21.0      42.66**      33.18*   29.7
 p <=  1        14.82*       11.53    14.1      16.28*       12.66    15.4
 p <=  2        1.458        1.134     3.8      1.458        1.134     3.8
standardized \beta’ eigenvectors
          gdp         gov         rex         oil
       1.0000    -0.35338    0.010273    0.095701
      -8.9008      1.0000     -1.4731      1.0480
      -393.47      15.416      1.0000      42.089
standardized \alpha coefficients
 gdp             0.15556    0.053233  0.00018777
 gov              2.3051     0.23814  -0.0018117
 rex             -1.0806     0.17247  -0.0010223
Table 2b. Restricted cointegration results
SYS General cointegration test 1995 (1) to 2001 (3)
\beta’
          gdp         gov         rex         oil
      -2.7076      1.0000     0.00000    -0.29737
       1.0000     0.00000     0.23785    -0.21723
\alpha
 gdp          -0.0017383    -0.32296
 gov            -0.57641     -1.3753
 rex             0.55433     -1.1148
                                                
8 PcGive (PcFiml) versions 9.21 and 10.0 were used for estimation.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2002
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Due to the small number of variables in the VAR system and rather strong and straightfor-
ward assumptions concerning possible links among the variables, it was relatively easy to
identify the two cointegration vectors (ß-vectors).
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show that none of the three variables in the VAR is weakly exogenous.
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As regards Russia’s GDP, the cointegration vector (see Figure 2) demonstrates that
there is a stationary long-run relationship so that the level of GDP depends on the level of
the real exchange rate and oil prices. For example, a permanent 10% appreciation of the
real exchange rate is associated with a 2.4 % drop in GDP. Respectively, a 10% permanent
increase in the level of international oil prices would cause the level of GDP to increase by
2.2%. While our framework does not allow for testing whether, in general, the rouble’s real
appreciation is associated with oil price increases, as one would expect, this question is
touched upon in the next section, which focuses on short-run issues.
The cointegration vector of fiscal revenues, for its part, indicates that a permanent 1%
change in the level of GDP is associated with a 2.7% change in the level of the central
government real revenues. However, the output elasticity of revenues seems to be more
sensitive to the estimation period than the other parameters of the system. In particular,
dropping out 1995 observations from the estimation period would cause the ß-coefficient
of output to decline to 1.6. A corresponding instability at the beginning of the sample pe-
riod is seen in the graph of the cointegration vector of government revenues in Figure 2.
This instability in the revenue equation demonstrates perhaps that a heavy transition-
related output and revenue decline continued until the latter part of 1995 and, hence,
caused the overshoot of the output elasticity.
11 Regarding oil prices, the long-run error-
correction mechanism suggests that a 10% change in the level of oil prices would in the
long run cause a 3.0% change in federal real revenues. Given the high volatility of oil
prices, this result seem to confirm the general belief that Russia’s fiscal revenues are heav-
ily affected by energy prices.
Figure 3 displays how the parameter estimates of cointegration vectors have devel-
oped over time. While one can notice a certain instability in the parameters, they never-
theless are perhaps more stable than one would expect. In particular, there are no clear
trends of change and, consequently, the parameter estimates do not support the views that
the role of oil or the real exchange rate in output determination have declined since the
1998 crisis. Rather, it seems that oil and the exchange rate developments have recently
become even more important than they used to be, although it is difficult to see why this
would have happened. Given frequent revisions of output data, naturally one cannot ex-
clude the possibility that there are some problems with the currently available data for
2001.
12
                                                
9 At every stage, restrictions were tested before proceeding to next step.
10 Neither of the two cointegration vectors could be identified as a reasonable long-run equilibrium
condition for the real exchange rate.
11 Cointegration estimation results for the sample period 1996:Q1 – 2001:Q3:
gdp = -0.30*rex + 0.20*oil
gov = 1.61*gdp + 0.52*oil
12 Parameter constancy tests (one-step residuals and Chow tests) of the initial VAR-model did not
either indicate particular problems, except in the GDP equation in 2001:2 and 2001:3. However,Jouko Rautava The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy
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Figure 2. Restricted cointegration vectors*










5.25 gov = 2.708*gdp+0.297*oil
gdp = -0.238*rex+0.217*oil
* Variables are scaled by means to fit the same picture.
Figure 3. Recursive estimates of the coefficients*




GDP equation: coefficient of rex




-0.10 GDP equation: coefficient of oil





-0.5 Revenue equation: coefficient of gdp







Revenue equation: coefficient of oil
* Note that the signs refer to the initial cointegration vectors.
                                                                                                                                                   
like “unexpected” changes of some coefficient parameters in Figure 3, it is difficult to interpret this
possible instability in the GDP equation at the end of the research period.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2002
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5  Short-run analysis: An error-correction model (ECM)
Although the focus of this paper is on the long-run impact of oil prices and the real
exchange rate on Russia’s output, also a short run error-correction model was estimated to
check the robustness of results. Thus, the VAR that forms the basis of the two error-
correction relationships above is mapped into a stationary I(0) system, and the
reformulated system is estimated using OLS. Corresponding to two lags in model of the
levels of the variables, the lag length in the system of variables in differences is one. After
getting a parsimonious VECM, the process of model reduction was continued by imposing
zero restrictions on insignificant regressors in each equation. A FIML method was used to
estimate the system. The estimation results are in Table 3 and diagnostic statistics are
presented in Table 4.
Table 3. A parsimonious short-run model
MOD Estimating the model by FIML (using Oil04.in7)
        The estimation sample is: 1995 (1) to 2001 (3)
Equation for: Dgdp
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob
Constant              1.97062     0.4074     4.84   0.000
emgdp_1             -0.396811    0.08218    -4.83   0.000
Dgov_1              0.0340297    0.01923     1.77   0.092
Equation for: Dgov
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob
Constant             -5.84886      1.650    -3.55   0.002
Doil                 0.549042     0.2363     2.32   0.031
emgov_1             -0.653168     0.1843    -3.54   0.002
Equation for: Drex
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob
Constant              2.85905      1.168     2.45   0.024
Dgdp_1                2.97370     0.6367     4.67   0.000
emgov_1              0.319423     0.1305     2.45   0.024
Drex_1               0.216113     0.1345     1.61   0.124
While the significance of each right-hand side variable greatly depends on the order in
which restrictions are imposed, there seem to be no major problems in ending up with quite
reasonable results, at least in qualitative terms. No major problems with the diagnostics of
the system or with the equations were found (see Table 4).
13
Thus, given the fact that the purpose is merely to check whether the long-run error-
correction variables really work in the short-run model, rather than build a realistic short-
run model, the most important findings are the following. First, the signs of the error-
correction parameters in the respective equations (i.e., –0.397 for  in the GDP
equation and –0.653 for 	 in the government revenue equation) are correct and they
both are statistically significant. Second, while the short-run effects of the oil price change
on output and the real exchange rate seem to be insignificant
14, the direct impact of the oil
                                                
13 Besides tests reported in Table 4, one-step residuals and Chow tests were conducted and no
problems with parameter constancy were found.
14 This might reflect the fact that smoothed data for oil prices are used.Jouko Rautava The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy
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price change (") on fiscal revenues is statistically significant. Thus, oil prices influence
fiscal revenues both directly and through the long-run equilibrium condition (error-
correction mechanism). Third, changes in output (" ), contrary to oil prices, have a
major impact on short-run real exchange rate developments. Fourth, besides long-run ef-
fects through the error-correction mechanism, GDP could be influenced by oil price
changes via the public sector, as indicated by the parameter of the revenue variable
("! ) in the short-run GDP equation. Thus, in the short-run, higher oil prices increase
government revenues, which possibly cause more public spending and, hence, output
growth.
15
An important result of the short-run exercise is also that the recursive estimation re-
sults do not reveal any major changes in the system during the sample period ending
2001:Q3. Thus, the impact of the outstanding reform initiatives by Putin’s administration
does not yet show up in a manner that would allow one to conclude that Russia’s depend-
ence on oil price developments has significantly weakened.
Table 4. Diagnostic statistics for the short-run model
correlation of structural residuals (standard deviations on diagonal)
               Dgdp         Dgov         Drex
Dgdp       0.015037      0.26572     0.080551
Dgov        0.26572      0.11733      0.48879
Drex       0.080551      0.48879     0.075999
Dgdp        : Portmanteau( 4): 4.16834
Dgov        : Portmanteau( 4): 2.06791
Drex        : Portmanteau( 4): 3.31222
Dgdp        : AR 1-3 test:      F(3,17)  =   2.4394 [0.0998]
Dgov        : AR 1-3 test:      F(3,17)  =   1.2448 [0.3245]
Drex        : AR 1-3 test:      F(3,17)  =   3.1756 [0.0509]
Dgdp        : Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   2.4374 [0.2956]
Dgov        : Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   2.2297 [0.3280]
Drex        : Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   3.8192 [0.1481]
Dgdp        : ARCH 1-3 test:    F(3,18)  =  0.31686 [0.8130]
Dgov        : ARCH 1-3 test:    F(3,18)  =   1.2468 [0.3222]
Drex        : ARCH 1-3 test:    F(3,18)  =  0.45480 [0.7171]
Dgdp        : hetero test:      F(12,11) =  0.62223 [0.7864]
Dgov        : hetero test:      F(12,11) =   1.2985 [0.3362]
Drex        : hetero test:      F(12,11) =   1.1276 [0.4246]
Vector Portmanteau( 4): 30.8271
Vector EGE-AR 1-3 test:  F(27,38) =  0.94608 [0.5533]
Vector Normality test:   Chi^2(6) =   7.1536 [0.3069]
Vector hetero test:      F(72,38) =  0.76807 [0.8332]
                                                
15 However, one should recognise that statistical evidence concerning the impact of oil prices on
the GDP through budgetary sector is relatively weak. Nevertheless, leaving out the revenue
variable from the output equation would cause diagnostic problems.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2002
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6  Robustness test: The role of raw materials
Due to the fact that crude oil exports account for only 20-25% of the total value of Russia’s
exports, a natural extension, or test, of the previous set-up is to replace the oil price vari-
able with a raw material price index. In this exercise a HWWA index for raw materials
(including energy) is used, which means that the price developments of some 70-80% of
Russian exports is now taken into account.
Replacing oil prices with the aggregate raw material price index seems to reinforce the
previous results. The results support the previous assumption concerning the existence of
two cointegration vectors (see Table 5). Moreover, Table 6 shows that the restricted coin-
tegration estimation results are very similar to the previous system, except that the effect of
the aggregate raw material price index (hwwa) is clearly stronger than that of the oil price
alone. Thus, for example, while the oil price elasticity for GDP in the previous set-up was
0.22, the raw material price elasticity of output is 0.49. Replacing the oil price variable
with the HWWA index does not change the results concerning the role of the real ex-
change rate.
In addition to long-run estimation results, also a short-run model based on the HWWA
index was found to be very similar to the one with the oil price variable. The error-
correction terms for GDP and federal revenues were both significant in the respective
equations, and the coefficient of the price variable was significant only in the equation for
fiscal revenues. Moreover, in this set-up fiscal revenues had clearly a statistically signifi-
cant positive impact on output growth.
Table 5. Cointegration results based on raw material prices (HWWA-index)
SYS Cointegration analysis 1995 (1) to 2001 (3)
    eigenvalue     loglik for rank
                     232.886   0
      0.632749       246.409   1
      0.474274       255.089   2
     0.0177708       255.331   3
Maximum eigenvalue test       Trace test
Ho:rank=p  -Tlog(1-\mu)   using T-nm   95%  -T\Sum log(.)  using T-nm   95%
 p ==  0        27.05**      21.04*   21.0      44.89**      34.91*   29.7
 p <=  1        17.36*        13.5    14.1      17.84*       13.88    15.4
 p <=  2       0.4841       0.3765     3.8     0.4841       0.3765     3.8
standardized \beta’ eigenvectors
          gdp         gov         rex        hwwa
       1.0000    -0.36838   -0.015776     0.24248
      -13.111      1.0000     -2.7270      4.4280
       11.165    -0.28206      1.0000    0.060921
standardized \alpha coefficients
 gdp             0.18727    0.021642  -0.0040968
 gov              3.0490     0.13145    0.012588
 rex            -0.89446     0.12378    0.010037Jouko Rautava The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy
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Table 6. Restricted cointegration results based on raw material prices (HWWA-index)
SYS General cointegration test 1995 (1) to 2001 (3)
\beta’
          gdp         gov         rex        hwwa
      -2.8753      1.0000     0.00000    -0.57960
       1.0000     0.00000     0.26642    -0.48923
\alpha
 gdp           -0.047347    -0.23260
 gov            -0.99175     -1.5260
 rex             0.45328     -1.2140
7  Conclusions
This paper examined how sensitive Russia’s output and fiscal policy are to changes in
international oil prices and the real exchange rate of the rouble. The findings support the
prevailing common view that both of these factors play a major role in the Russian
economy. More precisely, it was found that in the long run a 10% permanent increase (dec-
rease) in international oil prices is associated with a 2.2% growth (fall) in the level of Rus-
sian GDP. On the other hand, a 10% real appreciation (depreciation) of the rouble is asso-
ciated with a 2.4% decline (increase) in the level of GDP in the longer run. Correspon-
dingly, a 10% increase (decline) in oil prices is associated with a 3.0% increase (fall) in
federal government real revenues. The results confirm also the strong dependence of re-
venues on GDP developments (output elasticity is 2.7), although the estimated coefficient
is heavily influenced by particular factors for 1995. The estimated short-run model for the
Russian economy confirms that the long-run equilibrium conditions significantly affect the
short-run dynamics of real GDP and real budget revenues through an error-correction
mechanism. These results seem robust in the sense that similar effects – although stronger
as one might expect – are achieved by replacing oil prices with an index of a broad range
of raw material and energy prices.
The results of this study indicate that the impact of the oil price changes on output
could be balanced by respective changes in the real exchange rate. However, this counter-
balancing effect is not necessarily mechanical. Rather, from the economic policy perspec-
tive, Russia should continue to be prepared to tackle with the possible short-run problems
triggered by oil prices, while, at the same time, continue to decrease its dependency on
energy prices in the longer run through reform policies. In particular, given the important
role of real exchange rate, the findings presented here give support to anti-inflation poli-
cies, through which Russian policy makers could restrain the real appreciation of the rou-
ble and, hence, support output growth. In addition, while this study does not say much
about the determination of the real exchange rate itself, it does indicate that, in the short-
run, output developments seem to play an important role in the determination of the real
exchange rate (rather than, for example, oil prices). Regarding future work, it would be
interesting to see whether it would be possible to model the real exchange rate to take into
account also long-run dependencies. Moreover, when longer time series become available,
it will be possible to add some more variables to the VAR, in order to enrich the model and
analysis and to take into account other factors affecting economic growth.
An interesting question naturally is whether Russia’s economic reforms have started
to yield results that would decrease its dependence on oil prices. The estimation results of
this study do not reveal any indication of such tendencies.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2002
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Appendix 1. Diagnostic statistics for the long-run VAR
SYS Estimating the unrestricted reduced form by OLS
The present sample is:  1995 (1) to 2001 (3)
URF Equation 1 for gdp
Variable     Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob
gdp_1            0.69553      0.24555    2.833  0.0106
gdp_2          -0.087664      0.21204   -0.413  0.6839
gov_1           0.019707     0.030961    0.637  0.5320
gov_2          -0.018551     0.032534   -0.570  0.5752
rex_1          -0.087580     0.038663   -2.265  0.0354
rex_2           0.010950     0.042427    0.258  0.7991
oil             0.078578     0.027996    2.807  0.0113
Constant          1.8874      0.96530    1.955  0.0654
\sigma = 0.0169725   RSS = 0.005473259946
URF Equation 2 for gov
Variable     Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob
gdp_1          -0.062942       1.8412   -0.034  0.9731
gdp_2            0.96121       1.5899    0.605  0.5526
gov_1            0.26350      0.23215    1.135  0.2705
gov_2            0.13216      0.24395    0.542  0.5943
rex_1           -0.23759      0.28990   -0.820  0.4226
rex_2          -0.091336      0.31813   -0.287  0.7771
oil              0.39391      0.20992    1.876  0.0760
Constant         -1.2335       7.2381   -0.170  0.8665
\sigma = 0.127264   RSS = 0.3077273729
URF Equation 3 for rex
Variable     Coefficient    Std.Error  t-value  t-prob
gdp_1            0.91051       1.0632    0.856  0.4025
gdp_2            -3.1240      0.91811   -3.403  0.0030
gov_1            0.22953      0.13406    1.712  0.1031
gov_2            0.30904      0.14087    2.194  0.0409
rex_1             1.0427      0.16741    6.229  0.0000
rex_2           -0.30889      0.18371   -1.681  0.1090
oil             0.034304      0.12122    0.283  0.7802
Constant          8.8557       4.1797    2.119  0.0475
\sigma = 0.0734903   RSS = 0.1026157433
correlation of URF residuals
                     gdp         gov         rex
 gdp              1.0000
 gov             0.21780      1.0000
 rex            0.020036     0.44758      1.0000
standard deviations of URF residuals
          gdp         gov         rex
     0.016973     0.12726    0.073490
loglik = 254.21528  log|\Omega| = -18.8308  |\Omega| = 6.63597e-009  T = 27
log|Y’Y/T| = -13.3865
R^2(LR) = 0.995679  R^2(LM) = 0.684502Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2002
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F-test on all regressors except unrestricted, F(21,49) = 13.303 [0.0000] **
variables entered unrestricted:
  Constant
F-tests on retained regressors, F(3, 17)
      gdp_1     2.98259 [0.0605]         gdp_2     5.39736 [0.0086] **
      gov_1     1.00581 [0.4143]         gov_2     1.58624 [0.2295]
      rex_1     17.0853 [0.0000] **      rex_2    0.933135 [0.4462]
        oil     2.89999 [0.0652]
correlation of actual and fitted
          gdp         gov         rex
      0.96647     0.89830     0.94885
gdp     :Portmanteau  4 lags=   4.2898
gov     :Portmanteau  4 lags=   2.0671
rex     :Portmanteau  4 lags=   2.4351
gdp     :AR 1- 3 F( 3, 16) =      0.796 [0.5139]
gov     :AR 1- 3 F( 3, 16) =    0.48353 [0.6984]
rex     :AR 1- 3 F( 3, 16) =    0.71474 [0.5574]
gdp     :Normality Chi^2(2)=    0.84731 [0.6547]
gov     :Normality Chi^2(2)=     2.4846 [0.2887]
rex     :Normality Chi^2(2)=     3.1318 [0.2089]
gdp     :ARCH 3  F( 3, 13) =     0.2327 [0.8720]
gov     :ARCH 3  F( 3, 13) =    0.53099 [0.6689]
rex     :ARCH 3  F( 3, 13) =    0.22786 [0.8753]
gdp     :Xi^2    F(14,  4) =    0.29792 [0.9600]
gov     :Xi^2    F(14,  4) =    0.19965 [0.9898]
rex     :Xi^2    F(14,  4) =    0.73514 [0.7028]
Vector portmanteau  4 lags=   33.408
Vector AR 1-3  F(27, 24) =     1.0277 [0.4759]
Vector normality Chi^2( 6)=    5.8694 [0.4380]
Vector  Xi^2  Chi^2( 84) =      85.59 [0.4312]BOFIT Discussion Papers
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